BEFORE THE ENVIRONMENTAL APPEALS BOARD

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C.

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ORAL ARGUMENT

RE:

: NPDES Appeal No.

CITY OF LOWELL : 19-03

:

NPDES Permit No. MA0100633

Thursday, February 20, 2020

Administrative Courtroom Room 1152 EPA East Building

1201 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, DC

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m.

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE KATHIE A. STEIN Environmental Appeals Judge

THE HONORABLE AARON AVILA Environmental Appeals Judge

THE HONORABLE MARY KAY LYNCH

Environmental Appeals Judge

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the City of Lowell:

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ALSO PRESENT:

EURIKA DURR, Clerk of the Board

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

(10:31 a.m.)

MS. DURR: The Environmental Appeals
Board of United States Environmental Protection
Agency is now in session for oral argument, in re
City of Lowell, NPDES Permit Number MA0100633,
NPDES Appeal Number 19-03.

The Honorable Judges Mary Kay Lynch,
Kathie Stein, and Aaron Avila presiding. Please
turn off all cell phones and no recording devices
allowed. Please be seated.

JUDGE STEIN: Good morning, everyone.

The Environmental Appeals Court is hearing oral argument today in an appeal filed by the City of Lowell, Massachusetts, of an NPDES permit issued by Region I, which has been docketed before the Board as NPDES Case Number 19-03.

The City challenges several aspects of the NPDES renewal permit that Region I issued.

The argument will proceed in accordance with the Board's Order Scheduling Oral Argument, dated December 16, 2019.

This is an important case, and the Board very much appreciates the time and the effort each of you has expended in preparing briefs before the Board and to come to Washington, D.C. today for this argument.

We ask that you think of the next hour or so as an opportunity to have a conversation with us about the important issues in the case.

You should assume that we've read all the briefs and that we have closely examined the record. We therefore are likely to ask you several questions that will assist us in our deliberations, and you shouldn't assume by these questions that the Board has made any decisions as to any of the issues or arguments in this case, as we have not.

But we are going to use the opportunity to listen, to probe your legal positions; to be sure we understand your position, and the legal and the record support on which the permit is based.

As you know, there are a large number

1 of issues in the time allotted, so we ask that 2 Counsel and the Representatives come promptly to the podium in the time allotted. 3 4 There is no photographing, filming, or 5 recording of any kind that is permitted in the courtroom, and we ask that everybody honor that. 6 A few additional items: 7 Ιf 8 Plaintiff's Counsel or Petitioner's Counsel 9 intends to reserve time for rebuttal, please advise is at the beginning of the argument. 10 11 And before we begin, I would like each 12 party to introduce themselves and who is 13 accompanying them at the panel. I'm going to 14 start with the City of Lowell. Thank you, Your Honors. 15 MR. CALAMITA: 16 My name is Paul Calamita. I'm here on behalf of 17 the City of Lowell. 18 I'm with the firm of AquaLaw, and with 19 me is my colleague, Amanda Waters, also with 20 AquaLaw. 21 MR. KNAPP: Good morning, Your Honors. My name is Michael Knapp, Assistant Regional 22

Counsel with EPA Region I's Office of Regional 1 2 Counsel. With me this morning is my colleague, 3 4 Cayleigh Eckhardt. Also with me are my 5 colleagues Samir Bukhari of EPA Region I ORC and Pooja Parikh of the Office of General Counsel. 6 JUDGE STEIN: Thank you. 7 Mr. 8 Calamita, you may begin. And are you reserving 9 time? 10 MR. CALAMITA: Your Honor, if I may reserve five minutes. 11 Good morning, Your Honors. 12 Again, I 13 am Paul Calamita with AquaLaw here on behalf of 14 the City of Lowell, Massachusetts. Lowell is a small, poor community that 15 16 is trying its utmost to protect public health and 17 the environment. We don't want to be here, but 18 we are compelled to be here. 19 Our requests to meet with EPA before 20 permit issuance were denied. Personally, I think 21 if we'd had that opportunity either you would 22 have fewer issues before you or maybe no issues

before you today.

We do not seek to avoid any necessary or appropriate requirements. We do seek a permit that is internally consistent, which will allow us to successfully provide the maximum treatment possible, particular of wet weather flows.

For example, I will explain today that the flow limit in the permit, the failure to authorize a secondary bypass, the daily maximum bacteria limit, hinder our ability to maximize the treatment of flow, to provide a net environmental benefit.

In other areas, such as the requirement that CSO discharges meet water quality standards today, it's impossible. We try hard, we work in good faith, we're not good at the impossible.

So we seek consistency and fairness in the permit. We also are here to raise certain legal concerns with a couple of the issues.

I'd like to touch on six of the issues, six of the ten issues that we've raised.

1	The first is phosphorous.
2	JUDGE STEIN: The first is
3	phosphorous?
4	MR. CALAMITA: Phosphorous. You've
5	heard phosphorous before, so what's different?
6	We think three things are different. The first
7	is, EPA continues to impose the same 0.1
8	milligram per liter Gold Book value.
9	They may refer to it as a criteria,
10	and it is not. It is a value.
11	JUDGE STEIN: Before you go into the
12	Gold Book as a criterion, I do have a question.
13	So if I understand the Region's Response to
14	Comments, in response to a comment that there was
15	no water quality criterion in the Gold Book, the
16	Region explained that the Gold Book provided a
17	rationale for the water quality criterion in
18	various circumstances.
19	Can you point to where, if at all, the
20	City responded to that argument in its Petition?
21	MR. CALAMITA: Absolutely. That
22	argument goes to the EPA Regulation 12444

_	D(1)(0).
2	Our position is, and I think it's
3	EPA's position, that $D(1)(6)$, which both parties
4	have briefed in their positions, EPA's position
5	is they meet subsection A and B and D(1)(6).
6	Our position is that they don't meet
7	either, and I'm happy to explain that to you.
8	JUDGE LYNCH: But where in your record
9	or brief do you actually confront that article?
10	That argument?
11	MR. CALAMITA: City Petition at 8,
12	Your Honor, and EPA Responded at 9. So City
13	Petition at 8.
14	JUDGE AVILA: And that's Subpart A?
15	I saw Subpart B.
16	MR. CALAMITA: Your Honor, our
17	position is that they don't meet either.
18	JUDGE AVILA: Okay.
19	MR. CALAMITA: We've briefed both.
20	JUDGE AVILA: Okay.
21	JUDGE LYNCH: Counsel, when I look at
22	your Petition, it just restates a conclusory

1	statement. There's no analysis or, in fact,
2	argument.
3	Is there any place I can look in the
4	record for your actually confronting the Region's
5	Response to Comments?
6	MR. CALAMITA: Your Honor, our
7	position is that EPA didn't impose a limit that's
8	consistent with that standard. EPA has responded
9	at page
10	JUDGE LYNCH: Can you show me where in
11	the Comments the regulations were referenced? I
12	didn't see that.
13	MR. CALAMITA: Where in our permit
14	comments?
15	JUDGE LYNCH: Correct. I didn't see
16	any comment that referenced the regulations.
17	MR. CALAMITA: Your Honor, we
18	submitted 33 pages of comments that generally
19	pointed out that EPA's, the Gold Book number, was
20	not promulgated and it was not consistent with
21	EPA's regulations.
22	I apologize. I'd be looking through

it now to go back through our petition to offer you more. I would ask that you allow me to continue to explain briefly why we don't think they've met the regulation.

And if you later conclude that the City of Lowell has not properly teed up these issues so that the Board can hear them, you'll rule how you will.

JUDGE LYNCH: Go ahead.

MR. CALAMITA: Thank you. So the first point, I told you there were three things that are new about our challenge to the Gold Book.

The first thing is that the Gold Book is four pages. There's no book. It's four pages. That's all it is as to fresh water.

There's just four pages to it.

And it finishes with, no national criterion is presented for phosphate phosphorous for the control of eutrophication.

Our position is there's been hundreds of millions of dollars imposed on regulated

entities based on these four pages from 1986 or 1 2 so that's never been promulgated. JUDGE AVILA: Can I just inquire 3 4 I mean, as I looked at the Facts Sheet at 5 23 to 24 and the Response to Comments at 9 to 10, it looked like the Region looked at a variety of 6 7 sources, one of which is the Gold Book, the 8 Ecoregional Nutrient Criteria, and Nutrient 9 Criteria Guidance. So based on that, I mean, didn't they 10 look at a wide variety of things and then 11 12 ultimately decide that the Gold Book standard was 13 the right one to use? 14 MR. CALAMITA: They did, Your --15 They are using -- you JUDGE AVILA: 16 seem to be arguing only using the Gold Book. 17 MR. CALAMITA: Bear with me just one 18 second. 19 JUDGE AVILA: Okay. 20 MR. CALAMITA: Your Honor, none of 21 those sources you just cited have been 22 promulgated, Your Honor.

And so our view is that what's 1 2 different about this case is that it's yet another 0.1 Gold Book value with many more to 3 4 come. 5 And at some point, that regulatory 6 branch will fail, because the public safeguards of rulemaking around the 0.1 milligram Gold Book 7 8 value have been avoided intentionally and we 9 believe illegally. 10 JUDGE LYNCH: But Counsel, can I pause 11 you for a moment? The Region responded that the 12 Gold Book is not a rule, and they explained how 13 they used it and other sources. 14 And the only thing I saw in your 15 petition and reply is just a repetition of your 16 argument, not really analyzing or confronting 17 their response. 18 MR. CALAMITA: You're correct, Your 19 Their response was we do this Honor. 20 consistently. That's their word. Consistently. 21 We have a consistent process --

They had other

JUDGE LYNCH:

responses, but go ahead.

MR. CALAMITA: -- to apply the Gold Book value, and our position is we don't care.

It's not promulgated. That's number one.

Number two, going to the regulation, there are two potential parts of the regulation of D(1)(6). There's A and B. A identifies three specific state documents.

One is a state-proposed criterion,
which we don't have. A second is an explicit
state policy on phosphorous, which we don't have.
And the third is a state regulation interpreting
the narrative water quality standard at issue,
which we don't have.

What it goes on to say in A is, EPA can supplement, not supplant, supplement these three state documents with other information, include EPA criteria documents.

We don't believe EPA fits under A, because they're taking these four pages of the Gold Book to supplant, not supplement, the three very specific state items. That's A. B says --

1	JUDGE LYNCH: Can I pause you on A?
2	MR. CALAMITA: Yes, Your Honor.
3	JUDGE LYNCH: On Page 4 of your
4	petition, you claim that the Region erroneously
5	and illegally applied the state narrative
6	standard to arrive at the phosphorous limit.
7	Isn't it the case that Massachusetts
8	issued an identical permit?
9	MR. CALAMITA: Yes, Your Honor, but
10	not pursuant to EPA's regulation. There is no
11	state proposed criteria
12	JUDGE LYNCH: But in interpreting
13	their narrative criteria, presumably.
14	MR. CALAMITA: We don't find
15	presumably in the regulations or in the briefs,
16	Your Honor, on this point. We feel EPA fails to
17	satisfy
18	JUDGE LYNCH: I was asking about the
19	state issuing an identical permit with the same
20	phosphorous limit in it.
21	MR. CALAMITA: Yes, Your Honor. But
22	again, I don't believe that state permit

constitutes the three things, the three very 1 2 specific things, that the EPA regulation identifies. It doesn't say, or state permit. 3 JUDGE STEIN: So let me ask a separate 4 5 but related question. So the Gold Book, which is guidance, and it's been used by EPA for many 6 7 years as guidance, as a number of states, does 8 have some data in it as to why it is the 0.1 9 number is recommended. 10 Did you anywhere in your comments or 11 in your petition provide any counter to that 12 particular study, which is cited by the Gold Book 13 as guidance? MR. CALAMITA: 14 No, Your Honor. There is one 1973 study which we don't think says much 15 16 of anything, but we are not here to challenge EPA 17 on the science. 18 On the phosphorous limit, we think it 19 needs to be promulgated. 20 Second, we don't think it meets the 21 regulation, and the second part of that

regulation is B, which says a national, a 304(A)

criterion, they don't make B, even though they cite it, because of the very last sentence of the Gold Book, which says this is not a national criterion.

JUDGE STEIN: But that goes back to the first question that I asked you, which is that in the Response, and maybe, you know, you'll have an answer after you look at the record, but it seems to me that in its Response to Comments, the Region in fact gives a rationale for the water quality standards.

And that's the question that I think we've been asking of whether you gave us, if there is something else that you cited to, I think it would be helpful for us to know that.

MR. CALAMITA: Your Honor, I can't help you. The focus of our disagreement with EPA was the non-promulgation and not meeting the regulation.

We were not challenging the scientific information that they put in the record, even though, quite frankly, we don't think it was

I should also --1 adequate. 2 JUDGE LYNCH: Counsel, are you -- I'm not clear. Are you challenging the Gold Book or 3 the application of the Gold Book in this case? 4 5 MR. CALAMITA: We are challenging the 6 application of the Gold Book because it is 7 unpromulgated, number one. 8 Number two, it doesn't satisfy either 9 A or B in EPA's regulation. The use of it is inconsistent with those very specific 10 11 requirements in A or B. 12 In B, it's by its own terms. It's not 13 a national criterion. So they've got to find 14 their way into A, and we don't think they've done 15 that. 16 JUDGE STEIN: I'm going to suggest we 17 Just, we have five other issues, so 18 we've spent a lot of time on the --19 JUDGE LYNCH: I have one other

20

21

MR. CALAMITA: I believe the model's been developed, Your Honor. I'm not 100 percent sure, but I think the City has continued to work on that.

And I should have mentioned that the City is in the process, we're close to completing a phosphorous upgrade. So I told you, we're not trying to avoid necessary or appropriate requirements.

As we are on the cusp of finishing that upgrade, we're getting a Gold Book based number, then there may be an ecoregion number.

And then some time in the future we may get a promulgated water quality standard.

I will point out also, in this permit, the only pollutant limit, there are dozens of pollutant limits, and the only one that's not promulgated is phosphorous, and we don't understand why that should be.

I'd like to turn to effluent flow, the flow limit. This is part of the internal inconsistency.

On one hand, we're a wet weather 1 2 facility. We want to maximize CSO flows so we minimize the discharge of raw sewage. 3 4 On the other hand, the Region put a 5 flow limit on us, which we have violated in the past because we tried to do the right thing by 6 7 treating flow rather than letting it discharge 8 untreated. 9 EPA's response to our violating that limit is very instructive. They didn't fine us. 10 11 They gave us an administrative order that waived 12 the limit. We got an administrative order that 13 said for nine years --JUDGE STEIN: Did it waive the limit 14 15 or did it simply provide that for a period of 16 time, you simply needed to monitor? 17 MR. CALAMITA: For nine years, it 18 changed the limit to monitor only, from 32 19 million gallons to monitor only in --20 (Simultaneous speaking.) 21 JUDGE STEIN: Did it change the limit or did they simply exercise enforcement 22

1 discretion to allow -- I mean, I don't know that 2 they went in and changed the limit. You're correct, Your 3 MR. CALAMITA: 4 Honor. They exercised enforcement discretion. 5 They were so upset that they said, we're going to exercise your enforcement discretion here, give 6 7 you a monitor only, and keep doing it. 8 didn't say, oh, no, no, stop. This really 9 matters. 10 JUDGE LYNCH: What are you quoting 11 Where is this in the record? from? The 12 enforcement order is in the record, but you're 13 testifying about what the Region said or thought. 14 MR. CALAMITA: You're correct, Your 15 I stand corrected. The document speaks 16 for itself. The document says the document 17 imposed an indefinite, until the order is 18 modified or --19 JUDGE LYNCH: The word in the order is interim. 20 21 MR. CALAMITA: An interim --22 JUDGE LYNCH: Until a new permit is in place.

MR. CALAMITA: Right. That turned out to be nine years, Your Honor. And our point is that EPA points to nothing in that nine-year period where exercising enforcement discretion, to not enforce that limit was a problem.

We have to, the permit says we have to meet all limits. And so we've got a provision that says maximize flow, and a provision that says don't exceed 32 MGD as an annual average.

So in a wet year, what are we to do?

In November, are we to stop taking wet weather

flow so that we protect and make sure we don't

exceed this arbitrary number? Environmentally,

that would be the wrong answer.

JUDGE STEIN: If I understand correctly, the limit that you're objecting to was in your prior permit, is that correct?

MR. CALAMITA: That's correct.

JUDGE STEIN: And part of what -- I understand the flow argument that you're making.

I've read your submissions, but I'm

1 also looking at the regulations in 122.45(B)(1) 2 that seems to require that permit effluent limits be calculated based on design flow. 3 4 So in light of that language, why was 5 it improper for the Region -- maybe your argument 6 isn't that it's improper -- why was it improper 7 given that the Region was required to look at 8 design flow? 9 And it looks like they looked at the maximum design flow in calculating these limits? 10 11 Why is that improper in light of the regulatory 12 requirements? 13 MR. CALAMITA: It's not improper at 14 all, Your Honor. Every state and EPA Region 15 looks at design flow when they calculate permit 16 limits. 17 So they take design flow into account 18 in calculating permit limits. They don't make 19 flow a permit limit itself. They take it into --20 JUDGE STEIN: So why was it okay in 21 2005, but it's not okay in 2020? 22 MR. CALAMITA: It was an error. It's

been an error all along, Your Honor. And for example, we sit here in the District of Columbia.

We have the world's largest advanced plant. The permit's in the record. It has no flow limit. D.C. and EPA Region III took design flow into account and wrote a permit that didn't have a flow limit.

JUDGE STEIN: I mean, I understand that not all NPDES permits have flow limits, but I'm trying to sort of understand for the City of Lowell's permit why is it improper, you know, unlawful, or a clear error, for that limit to be there? I mean, I understand that some of this kind of segues into some of your other issues about CSOs and the long-term control plan.

But with respect to that limit, which was based on the regs, I'm assuming that that design flow was part of what led, at least from the briefs, the Region to set the limit where it set it.

MR. CALAMITA: That's correct. And any flow above the 32 still has to meet the same

1 32-based limits, which means if our flow goes 2 above 32, our concentrations have to come down to still meet our mass limits. 3 So there's no scenario where higher 4 5 flow jeopardizes water quality, and that's why we don't have a flow limit here in the District or 6 Columbia or in a whole number of states. 7 8 JUDGE LYNCH: Well, Counsel, I have a 9 question about your argument in your reply brief that you don't need to worry about flow because 10 11 the mass limits in the permit will take care of 12 it. But isn't it the case that not all the 13 14 parameters have mass limits, including 15 phosphorous, which is a concentration limit? 16 MR. CALAMITA: Your Honor, we were 17 given, we still would have to meet that 18 phosphorous concentration. And so if our flows 19 are higher --

JUDGE LYNCH: I'm asking about your argument that mass limits take care of any flow issue.

20

21

1	MR. CALAMITA: We think all the
2	pollutants that are mass dependent, that where
3	mass matters in the permit, have mass limits.
4	It's no different than here in the District of
5	Columbia. They
6	JUDGE LYNCH: And that does not
7	include phosphorous, is that correct?
8	MR. CALAMITA: That does not include
9	phosphorous, correct?
10	MR. CALAMITA: That does not include
11	phosphorus.
12	JUDGE LYNCH: One other question in
13	your brief on Page 8 to 9 of your reply brief you
14	say exceedance of flow limit only happens during
15	wet weather. Where in the record can I look to
16	substantiate that?
17	MR. CALAMITA: Your Honor, the EPA
18	Facts Sheet, Fact Sheets normally specify a dry
19	weather flow. It did not. I did look for that
20	last night.
21	The reality is that these the flow
22	

it's when rivers are high or it's raining. 1 2 in either of those contexts, you can't be at a drought condition. 3 And so that's why there isn't a flow 4 5 limit here in D.C. and in so many of these wet weather facility permits because it's not a 6 7 concern. 8 JUDGE LYNCH: I was asking for the 9 record's support for your specific statement. JUDGE STEIN: So I'm looking at the 10 11 clock here, and you have several more issues. I 12 am going to ask the clerk to add ten minutes to 13 your time, and to do the same for the Region, 14 because we want to be sure that you have an opportunity to give us what you came here to do. 15 16 But I'm going to suggest we move on to --JUDGE AVILA: Could I ask one question 17 18 about the flow reg? 19 JUDGE STEIN: Sure. 20 JUDGE AVILA: Just putting aside the 21 regulation, I thought in the Facts Statement, the

Facts Sheet and the Response to Comments, the

Region said that without the flow rate the effluent criteria may not be protective of the water quality standards, and they go through why, the dilution problem and things like that.

And I didn't see anything in your petition addressing that part of the issue. So is there anything that I'm missing on that, on the science part of it?

MR. CALAMATI: Your Honor, we noted that the concern of high flow during sub-drought river conditions are mutually exclusive.

And what I would ask on the flow issue is what's different about Lowell versus the District of Columbia? Sure, we're smaller and poorer, but we're both CSO communities.

We have the same permit limits. Why is there no flow limit here? I hope Mr. Knapp will explain that to you.

And whatever your concern is about the science, why that concern isn't here in a permit that's gone before this Board several times and is scrutinized heavily, but Lowell needs it.

As I stand here today, I honestly, I do not know the answer and couldn't explain to my client. The big thing to think about here, though, is if we really comply with this flow limit, we will throttle our plan in wet years.

And that will require untreated sewage to go out.

Lowell hasn't done that. We have done the right thing, and that's why we had that enforcement order. But while we're doing the right thing of intentionally not complying with our flow limit, we also think EPA should do the right thing and maybe we ought to get a little bit of the D.C. water treatment on flow.

On bacteria, the key issue here is we have an instream single sample -- not daily max - an instream single sample on a number of 235.

And the Region's position is that there's some Massachusetts regulation that requires, that mandates, a daily maximum permit.

We can't find it. There's nowhere
we've seen in any Massachusetts regulation that
says a POTW or any discharger has a daily maximum

for bacteria. We don't see it.

And as a matter of fact, the Region didn't do that. The Region manipulated it, but didn't, as I'll explain in a second, but didn't manipulate it consistent with the regulation that you've heard several times before about monthly, weekly limits, unless impracticable, for POTWs.

The manipulation was, they took a single sample 235, and they changed it into a daily maximum. Daily maximum is not single sample. We could take -- these are grab samples. We could take four or five of them and they made the number 409.

So they had no qualms about doing some math and manipulating the single sample into a daily max at a different number.

What they didn't do was the proper math of monthly, weekly limits unless impracticable, and the --

JUDGE LYNCH: But Counsel, did you -what the Region cites to is the Massachusetts
regulation, which talks about a single sample

maximum. Did you review that? 1 2 MR. CALAMATI: I have. That is the water quality standard, Your Honor. 3 4 JUDGE LYNCH: And so, what's the 5 difference between that and the daily limit? MR. CALAMATI: As the court in the 6 7 Anacostia case, the Federal District Court here 8 in the Anacostia bacteria TMDL case so eloquently 9 said is just because you have a water quality standard or even a TMDL implementing that 10 11 standard, fear not, it doesn't mean it gets 12 copied into the permit. And as a matter of fact, it didn't. 13 14 The 235 was not copied into the permit. It would 15 have been a single sample 235. It's not. 16 daily max 409. 17 And our only point is, while they were 18 doing that math, they should have respected the 19 They can calculate a weekly number, regulation. 20 just like a lot of other states have, just as 21 easily as they calculated that daily maximum.

JUDGE LYNCH: And then in your

petition and in reply, you raise an argument that the Region had the burden to show that the weekly limit was impracticable.

That looks like a new argument to me.

I did not find that in any of the comments.

MR. CALAMATI: Your Honor, we raised that argument in relation to the three limits, a daily maximum total suspended solid limit, BOD limit, and bacteria limit.

And I just looked at this yesterday.

On the daily maximum and BOD, we very clearly
laid out that regulation on Pages 6 or 8 of our
comments, and then two pages later when we got to
the bacteria daily maximum, we said for the same
reasons noted above.

We didn't regurgitate the whole thing, but we did incorporate the same argument that we use for the two daily maxes by the way that were removed from the permit.

This is the daily max that's not removed, and we would just suggest that you need to find somewhere in the regulation that commands

a permit limit of daily max for their argument to prevail on that.

One of the major issues in the permit, this is the impossible, is there's language in the permit that requires that Lowell's CSO discharges meet water quality standards now.

And of course, we don't. That's impossible. And EPA, the applicable, it says we have to -- I'm sorry, the CSO policy says we have to apply with the applicable water quality standards no later than the date allowed under the State Water Quality Standards. Same language that EPA cites. It's at their response at 21, so they acknowledge that.

The Massachusetts Compliance Schedule

Language requires compliance at the earliest

practical time as determined by the Department.

And so Lowell sits here, by the way, in a city that doesn't have to meet water quality standards today for their CSO discharges. They got a compliance schedule. You have that case.

Lowell sits there and says, well, what

was the date? Where did Massachusetts determine the earliest practicable time? And how is it the past? Because we're still building our program. We don't even have an approved long-term control plan.

The other thing is the CSO policy further speaks to this. It says as part of developing that long-term control plan, the state and EPA and the community should work together to figure out what the right water quality standards are and whether they need to be tailored.

So our position is we're not even sure yet what the right standards are as contemplated by the policy.

JUDGE STEIN: But isn't this being dealt with in the 2017 Enforcement Order, that I had understood that an enforcement order had been issued and certain requirements were put on the City of Lowell and that Lowell's in the process of submitting various things that are required by that Enforcement Order? I don't understand why --

The Order required

JUDGE LYNCH:

Lowell to submit their integrated plan, including CSO plan, which the previous one you submitted was not approved because it was deficient.

It required you to submit that in

It required you to submit that in December 2019. Has that happened? Have you submitted it?

MR. CALAMATI: I don't know, Your

Honor, because that's not part of what's before

us, but the question is, the compliance

schedule's a matter of state discretion, and

Massachusetts says compliance at the earliest

practicable time.

And so I'm just asking when was that?
When was the earliest practicable time? Because
we're not aware of it.

And again, the CSO policy has other provisions in it that suggest that we haven't even identified what those water quality standards are.

And then equally importantly, the policy in Section 4 identifies two types of permits language, Phase 1 and Phase 2.

1 And the Phase 2, which is when you 2 have an approved long-term control plan, that's the first time it says numerical limits. 3 4 JUDGE STEIN: So what with respect to 5 the CSO, what is it that you're challenging? Region's refusal to sign off on your secondary 6 7 bypass for (unintelligible)? 8 MR. CALAMATI: No, this issue is the 9 provision in the permit that says the CSO discharges can't violate water quality standards. 10 11 Well, the policy JUDGE LYNCH: 12 requires that to be in a permit, on Page 18696 of 13 the policy. 14 MR. CALAMATI: It does. No later, the policy says, put that in and require compliance, 15 16 no later than the date allowed under the state's 17 water quality standards. 18 JUDGE LYNCH: Where does the Clean 19 Water Act or the policy excuse -- where does the 20 Clean Water Act excuse non-compliance? 21 MR. CALAMATI: There is no non-22 compliance, Your Honor. The CSO policy 4022 says

1 identify a program to meet water quality, build 2 the program in accordance with a compliance schedule as soon as ---3 4 (Simultaneous speaking.) JUDGE LYNCH: I thought you said that 5 your CSOs were not meeting water quality 6 7 standards? 8 They don't, and they MR. CALAMATI: 9 can't until we've done that program and then that's the practicable, that's the right time. 10 11 But our position is, EPA needs to show 12 where in the Massachusetts rules it requires CSO 13 compliance. And again, Lowell is being treated 14 differently than other folk --JUDGE LYNCH: Well, what are your 15 16 obligations under the CSO policy? To submit a 17 plan, which you did in 2014 that was deficient, 18 correct? 19 MR. CALAMATI: Your Honor, I was not 20 Counsel to the city at that time. All I can 21 speak to is that no CSO community can meet this

language and the policy, nor Massachusetts

compliance schedule provision, neither supports 1 2 the inclusion of this restriction in the permit. JUDGE STEIN: Okay, so I would like to 3 4 ask and be sure that before your time expires, I understand your argument about narrative 5 standards. 6 7 Are you arguing that narrative 8 standards can never be included in permits, or 9 only that narrative standards can't be included in a permit if a numeric standard has been set 10 11 for the permit? 12 MR. CALAMATI: Our argument, Your 13 Honor, is that we're entitled to -- if you put a 14 catch-all that says don't violate water quality standards, you write the permit shield section 15 16 out of the Clean Water Act. 17 That section says EPA is supposed to 18 identify the limitations that are necessary. 19 They do their Reasonable Potential Analysis. We 20 get a permit. 21 And as long as we comply with that, 22 we're in compliance. If they put a catch all, we

have no fair notice of what we can discharge in 1 2 what amounts. And let me give you one example. 3 If these folks are right that we 4 Phosphorous. 5 need a limit, well, arguably we've been discharging too much phosphorous for years and 6 that general water quality standard compliance, 7 8 we've been violating that. 9 JUDGE LYNCH: Can a permit ever have 10 (Simultaneous speaking.) 11 JUDGE LYNCH: -- narrative criteria? 12 MR. CALAMATI: I think a permit can have narrative criteria. We're not unreasonable. 13 14 We will take the general water quality standards language in the District of Columbia's permit in 15 16 Part 2(A)(2). 17 We're not unreasonable. We think 18 that's okay language. We think it checks the box 19 that you feel like you need to check. I'm not familiar with 20 JUDGE STEIN: 21 that language off the top of my head. I might have been familiar some years ago, but I'm not 22

familiar at the moment.

But let me ask you a hypothetical.

Why is it unlawful or improper for the Region to include a state narrative standard for nutrients as well as a numeric standard for phosphorous, given that the narrative standard would also apply to other pollutants that may impact nutrients?

For example, nitrogen. So if you have a -- at least in a circumstance where you have a general narrative standard for nutrients that would cover more than just phosphorous -- why couldn't you have a narrative standard for nutrients and a numeric standard for phosphorous under those circumstances? Why is that wrong?

MR. CALAMATI: It's wrong, Your Honor, because there's no fair notice of how much of that other nutrient we can discharge.

There's no opportunity for the public -- may I finish my --

JUDGE STEIN: Yes.

MR. CALAMATI: There's no opportunity

1 for the public to comment on that. There's no 2 right of appeal. And most importantly, as a local 3 government, there's no opportunity for a 4 5 compliance schedule that Massachusetts law would It's a gotcha. It's behind us. 6 allow. I might have been --7 8 JUDGE STEIN: Doesn't that simply 9 write the concept of narrative standards out of existence, if that's your argument? 10 11 I mean, for years there have been 12 numerous narrative standards and a smaller subset 13 of numeric, but if I understand your argument, 14 what you're saying is because we don't have a 15 number; therefore we don't know what we have to 16 comply with. 17 I mean, it seems to me that that 18 fundamentally attacks the concept of narrative 19 standards to begin with. 20 MR. CALAMATI: Five seconds to respond 21 to that? 22 JUDGE STEIN: Yes.

No, there's perfectly 1 MR. CALAMATI: 2 good narrative standards. No visible sheen, no fish kill. 3 There are all sorts of narrative 4 5 standards that are okay, but this general water quality standards provision in our permit 6 7 probably has us violating the permit for 8 phosphorous based on what they've found. 9 And no due -- no fair notice, no due 10 process, no compliance schedule. So we --11 JUDGE AVILA: So are you saying that 12 rather than saying in the permit that the discharge shall not cause a violation of the 13 14 water quality standards of the receiving water, 15 that they had put the discharge shall not cause 16 fish kill? That would be okay? 17 MR. CALAMATI: We would have no 18 objection to that, Your Honor. 19 JUDGE AVILA: So that's what --20 MR. CALAMATI: I also want to 21 reiterate, we'll take the language in the D.C. permit that's in the record. Thank you, Your 22

Honors.

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2 JUDGE STEIN: Anything else for you?

JUDGE LYNCH: No.

4 JUDGE STEIN: Thank you very much.

And I would like to give the Region equal time,

6 so if we can assure that that happens.

MR. KNAPP: Good morning, Your Honors.

My name again is Michael Knapp. I'm with EPA

Region I.

I will be addressing four of the issues that are before the Board today. My colleague, Cayleigh Eckhardt, will be addressing the remaining.

Before I get into those four issues, there's two broad points I'd like to make.

First, I think much of what you just heard from Counselor reveals a fundamental flaw of what they're asking, and that is they are asking for the Region to do in a permit what is more appropriately done in an Enforcement Order. And we will get into that as I get into the four issues. But I think that was revealed in the

conversation that was just had.

Second, I would like to emphasize that this petition is riddled with procedural errors.

The Region has documented those in both our reply and in our surreply.

We won't take the time now to rehash those, but we do urge the Board to take those procedural errors seriously.

Moving on to the four issues that I will be addressing, I'm going to lay them out, give you a quick bullet point of why you should affirm the Region's position, and then I'll move on to more detail.

First, with regards to the effluent flow limit, this was an appropriate condition or limitation necessary to achieve compliance with water quality standards and therefore consistent with Section 402 and 301 of the Act.

With regards to Petitioner's claim with during the long-term control plan, the CSO policy very clearly gives the permitting authority discretion as to which document to

enshrine requirements for the long-term control plan, and the Region reasonably put those requirements in an Enforcement Order, which is part of this record.

Third, with regards to the bypass language, that language is required under EPA regulations. EPA included it verbatim as it appears in the regulations, as it has in the previous versions of this Permittee's permit.

Finally, with regards to the e-Coli daily maximum limit, this permit term was based clearly and directly on the Massachusetts Water Quality Standard, and therefore consistent and drives from our authority at 301 and 402.

I will address the four issues in that order, unless the Board has a preference.

With regards to the effluence wastewater flow limit, this limit is a condition or limitation necessary to ensure compliance with water quality standards. Again, thus rooted in 402 and 301 and EPA regulations at 122.4(D).

This is so because the Region uses the

1 facility's design flow, as the Board noted 2 previously, which they're required, the Region is required, all permitting authorities are required 3 to use in calculating water quality standards. 4 We used that flow in the formulas, 5 both to set the water quality-based effluent 6 7 limitations and to conduct the reasonable 8 potential analyses. 9 If the facility discharges at levels 10 beyond that flow, the Region cannot be assured 11 that those calculations were accurate, and 12 therefore ---13 (Simultaneous speaking.) 14 JUDGE LYNCH: Why is that? What does that increase in flow, how does it cause a 15 16 problem? 17 MR. KNAPP: Well, for example, Your 18 Honor, as you were proposing earlier with regards 19 to concentration-based only limits in this permit 20 there are several. 21 If they increase their flow, the 22 overall amount of the pollutant entering into the

water body is more than what the Region assumed when we calculated the assimilative capacity of that water body and how much it could handle, and therefore we could not be sure that it could handle that additional amount of the pollutant and still achieve water quality standards.

JUDGE STEIN: So how do you respond to Mr. Calamita's argument that there -- made here and in the briefs, that there are numerous permits around the country that don't have flow limits?

And if you do, in fact -- this is more of my comment than his -- if you do in fact have a problem, you've got enforcement mechanisms to deal with the problem. How do you respond to those questions?

MR. KNAPP: With regards to your first question, Your Honor, first of all, citations to other permits that have unique facts, situations, that may inform the direction a permit writer made, we think, and we think this Board's precedent is clear, that that's an inappropriate

line of argument.

Beyond that, there may be different reasonable approaches a permit writer could take to address the issue of flow and how it relates to water quality standards.

When you have a mass-based and a concentration-based limit, that may be sufficient to ensure water quality standards for that effluent limitation.

Again, here, we do not have just mass and concentration-based limits. And this is appropriate because the regulations direct EPA to mirror the form that the state's water quality standards have when writing permit limits.

So where the state water quality standard's concentration only, that is the form that EPA uses in writing our permits. And that's where the flow limit really becomes key. In addition --

JUDGE AVILA: Can I just pause there?

So then how much of your argument for the flow is based on the fact that the reg is requiring that

1 the effluent limitations, what is the language, 2 be based on design flow? I mean, because -- go ahead. 3 4 MR. KNAPP: That is a key part, it's 5 a key element of support, but it's certainly not 6 the only one. We think it's indicative that the 7 8 Agency intended for permit writers to use that 9 design flow and for that to be a limitation on the discharge. 10 11 But really, at the end, it's Sections 402 and 301 that really roots this authority 12 13 because it's necessary to achieve water quality 14 standards. 15 JUDGE LYNCH: I have a question 16 related to that, the problem with increasing the 17 flow. 18 On Page 8 of your Facts Sheet, you say 19 that increasing the flow will decrease the 20 dilution. Can you explain that? 21 MR. KNAPP: Increasing the flow, I think, where we said it could decrease the 22

1 dilution, I think again that's a scenario we were 2 trying to analyze. What were the potential implications 3 4 if there were --5 JUDGE LYNCH: That's fine. So potentially, how would that work? 6 MR. KNAPP: Your Honor, I can't speak 7 8 directly to that question, that technical 9 question. I can tell you, I reiterate, though, 10 11 that the record is clear that if there were 12 increased flow, there is the potential for more 13 pollutant in the water body, and therefore 14 calling into question those calculations that the 15 Region used to determine whether water quality standards would be met. 16 17 Or again, there's the second part of 18 that under the reasonable potential analyses, 19 because there were several. 20 For example, the metals here, where we 21 determined there wasn't reasonable potential

based on that design flow.

I suppose that if 1 JUDGE AVILA: 2 there's more pollutant in the water and the instream flow is low, then there wouldn't be as 3 4 much dilution. Is that a possibility? MR. KNAPP: That does stand to reason, 5 6 Your Honor. 7 I'd move on to the second point, and 8 that is the Region has demonstrated in the past 9 with this Permittee that it can balance this necessary water quality-based condition or 10 11 limitation with the CSO policy's direction to 12 maximize flow to the treatment plant. 13 There's a couple subpoints I'd like to 14 make here. First, the provisions are not 15 16 inherently contradictory or intention. 17 only where the facility is, in maximizing flow, 18 brings in more flow than what it's designed to 19 do, that these two permit terms --20 JUDGE STEIN: But doesn't that happen? 21 I mean, if you look at the weather in 22 Massachusetts on any given day, you can't really

expect Lowell to be, well, Lowell's not in charge of the weather, so --

MR. KNAPP: It undoubtedly --

JUDGE STEIN: -- there is an unpredictability element to what the wet weather events are going to be. So doesn't Lowell have a point?

MR. KNAPP: It is clear that this

Permittee has struggled with this flow limit, and

it should be to be expected, based on where this

Permittee is.

But the proper response to this, with the Permittee's inability to comply with a permit term, is not to remove the permit term with which they are struggling to comply with and create a perverse incentive where non-compliance results in ever-less strict permit terms.

The proper response, which the Region has done here, is to use our enforcement tools to provide the facility, the Permittee, with the time and the space necessary to make its improvements to its facility, ideally through

developing a long-term control plan, implementing the provision of the long-term control plan, so that one day they might get to the point where they can both maximize flow and operate within the design capacity of its treatment plant. That is the goal at the end of the day.

JUDGE STEIN: Do you know whether the submissions -- excuse me -- that were required by the 2017 Order were made at the end of December?

MR. KNAPP: They were. On December 31st of this past year, EPA received the city's integrated plan, which included updated long-term control plan. And we are in the process of reviewing that document.

JUDGE LYNCH: I had a question about Lowell's argument on the CSO water quality standard compliance language.

What Counsel for Lowell said was he recognized that the CSO policy calls for that language to be in permits, but it says no later than the date allowed under the state's water quality standards expressed in the form of a

What's your response to that, his argument?

narrative limitation.

MR. KNAPP: Your Honor, if I may, that is an issue that my colleague is going to respond, but I will say one thing, is that this permit, that term is included identically in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Permit, which I think is instructive on that point.

But on the CSO narrative water quality standard, my colleague will be addressing that.

JUDGE LYNCH: Okay. That's fine

MR. KNAPP: If there are no more

questions on flow, I will move on to the long
term control plan, four substantive points to

make on this point.

CSO policy, which is implemented in the Act at 402(Q), very clearly gives the permitting authority discretion with regard to what document to include the requirements both to submit an LTCP and to require its implementation.

It uses the term appropriate

enforceable mechanism eight times in the policy.

It talks about NPS permits, enforcement orders or information requests. I think it's very clear that the Region had the discretion, appropriately used that direction to include it in and enforcement order, which it did. It's Exhibit 12 in this record.

Second, using an enforcement order provides the Permittee with important flexibility in its development of a long-term control plan that would be more difficult to achieve in the context of an NPDES permit.

So if you look at the 2017

Administrative Order requiring its development,
it talks about the Permittee using an adaptive
management approach to develop its long-term
control plan.

That is more easily done in an enforcement context than it is if we enshrine everything right there in an NPDES permit.

And that is part of the reason the Region took this approach, and it's reasonable.

JUDGE STEIN: So how, if at all, do those two different documents marry themselves up? You've got an enforcement order. You've got a permit.

This is something that would be addressed in a renewal permit? Or do we always have these two separate tracks -- excuse me, one the permit, two the enforcement order?

MR. KNAPP: At this point, Your Honor, based on where the City of Lowell is, they are operating on separate tracks, at the point where the city has implemented its long-term control plan and it should be at the point at demonstrating it can achieve water quality standards.

I think the CSO policy envisions that the permit at that point may include numeric-based water quality standards effluent limitations, and that's kind of the point where those two documents converge.

But the City of Lowell is far from being at that point, as Counselor mentioned.

They don't even have a long-term control plan approved at this point.

With that, I'll move on to the issue of bypass. This language that the Region included in the permit term, which again was included in previous versions of Permittee's permit, is required under 40 CFR 122.41(M)(4)(1).

The Region included it verbatim. The CSO policy is clear that bypass is prohibited and that the regs require this.

Second, the CSO policy does articulate an alternative approach where bypass could be approved prospectively rather than on a case-by-case basis as is the default under the regs and this permit term.

And the Region noted this to

Petitioner in our response to its comments.

However, there's factual predicates that

Petitioner, the Permittee, must provide to the

Region to give us an informed basis to invoke

that prospective approach, and Petitioner simply
has not provided that.

For example, a key element of the analysis is an analysis of reasonable alternatives.

And if you look at EPA's 2016 letter,

And if you look at EPA's 2016 letter, which is Exhibit 8 in the record, rejecting their long-term control plan, one of the bases for rejecting that plan was that it did not have any reasonable alternatives analysis.

JUDGE LYNCH: Counsel, Counsel for
Lowell said that the City tried to meet with the
Region about their permit and that the Region
declined. Can you tell me about that?

MR. KNAPP: Certainly, Your Honor. So the Region met with the City of Lowell and its contractors on May 15th, 2019, before issuing the draft permit.

Additionally, the permit writer had a meeting directly with the City of Lowell on April 9th of 2019.

The Region did decline a request to meet with the Permittee after the comment period had concluded. And that decision was partially

based on the fact that the Region is, and the Agency as a whole, is committed to reducing its NPDES permit backlog.

We frequently get requests from permittees to meet after the comment period. And in an effort to get permits out efficiently and expeditiously, those requests are most commonly denied.

But we did meet with them before the draft permit was issued. They had their required ability to comment on the draft permit.

JUDGE LYNCH: Am I correct that in one of your filings, you indicated that with respect to the CSO bypass alternative flexibility or mechanism, that the Region does stand ready to meet with Lowell?

MR. KNAPP: Absolutely. That is something the Region is very much prepared to do and presumably would be a reasonable conversation to have with its most recent submission at the end of this last year. Those are conversations that the Region is happy to have.

With that, I'll move on to my last issue, which is the e-Coli daily maximum limit.

I haven't been honing in on procedural flaws, but this is one where I really want to emphasize that we think it's one of the more egregious procedural flaws for two reasons.

One, the City simply did not raise the issue of impracticability at the time in its

Petition or in its comments on the draft permit
- sorry, in its comments on the draft permit did

not raise this issue.

Second, the Region was clear in its Response to Comments that this permit term was based on the Massachusetts water quality standard, and it is not until Petitioner's surreply that it first meaningfully engages in that basis and tries to offer some rebuttal for that basis.

So we'd urge the Board to take those procedural flaws seriously. I will say, second, this limit is based on the Massachusetts water quality standard. It was cited earlier in the

discussion with Counsel.

I'll note that the Commonwealth issued this permit with the exact same identical permit term.

JUDGE LYNCH: So a technical question.

Are you saying, and you may or may not be, that
the Massachusetts -- I'll refer to it as the
single sample maximum, is that the same or
equivalent to a daily limit?

MR. KNAPP: It is the basis for the daily limit. And so EPA, in coordination with the Commonwealth, looks at that standard. The permit writer looks at that standard, and this has been the practice for some years on this specific standard, and determines the most reasonable way to implement that standard is a daily maximum limit.

I understand Counselor's argument that it is not verbatim, the exact terms, but I would argue it's a distinction without a difference where you have a daily maximum, no single sample taken within that day could exceed the threshold

provided there. 1 2 And so I think it's a very reasonable approach to take, just buttressed by the fact 3 that the Commonwealth uses the same permit term. 4 5 JUDGE AVILA: But if it's the same, why not make life easier and just track the 6 Massachusetts reg language? 7 8 I guess I'm struggling to figure out, 9 it's a distinction without a difference, why create the difference in the first place? 10 11 MR. KNAPP: That could be a reasonable 12 approach, Your Honor. That's not the approach that the EPA and the Commonwealth has used. 13 14 And this is a permit term that has 15 appeared for some years now, and this is the 16 approach that has been --17 JUDGE AVILA: That's why I wanted to 18 be clear, that your position is it's a 19 distinction without a difference. 20 MR. KNAPP: If we were to say, no 21 single sample, yes, as compared to the daily

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maximum limit. Yes.

1	JUDGE AVILA: All right.
2	JUDGE STEIN: I want to be sure that
3	your co-counsel has time for her arguments.
4	MR. KNAPP: Thank you, Your Honor.
5	JUDGE STEIN: So if you have any final
6	questions
7	JUDGE LYNCH: I just need a
8	clarification. I have a question about the
9	phosphorous limit and the Gold Book. Is that
10	MR. KNAPP: Yes.
11	JUDGE LYNCH: Okay. Great. Thank you.
12	MR. KNAPP: Thank you.
13	MS. ECKHARDT: Thank you, Your Honors.
14	Again, my name is Cayleigh Eckhardt for Region 1.
15	JUDGE STEIN: Can you put the
16	microphone a little closer? I'm having trouble
17	hearing you.
18	MS. ECKHARDT: Sure. Is that better?
19	JUDGE STEIN: Yes.
20	MS. ECKHARDT: So as my co-counsel
21	stated, I'm going to talk about three major
22	issues, one being the narrative water quality

standard permit limits included in the permit.

Two, the phosphorous limits, and three, if

there's any remaining time or interest by the

Board, I can discuss the testing and monitoring

requirements that are included in the permit.

But before I begin, I just want to make one slight clarification related to a question that you asked of my co-counsel related to the dilution factor issue.

So to answer your question more precisely, the more flow going into the water -- so more flow going into the water will change the ratio between the effluent flow and the receiving water flow.

And EPA sets permit limits and determines them to be protective, pursuant to 402 and 301, based on a constant ratio calculated on the worst case effluent flow.

So that's equal to the design flow and receiving water flow at 7Q10. And so that's why when flow is increased into the receiving water, it could impact water quality standards.

And without going down a rabbit hole, 1 2 I'll now turn to the issues that I'm going to discuss. 3 4 JUDGE AVILA: Sorry. I'm going to go 5 down the rabbit hole. If that's true, why don't all permits have that requirement in them? 6 7 the design flow not being seen in them? 8 MS. ECHKARDT: I think that's the 9 mechanism by which we ensure compliance with 301 and 402. Other permitting authorities have found 10 other means and ways of ensuring compliance. 11 12 JUDGE AVILA: Thank you. MS. ECKHARDT: So now I'll first talk 13 14 about the water quality standards compliance language, the narrative permit limits. 15 16 So there are two in this permit, 17 Section 1(A)(2) and 1(F)(2)(B) in the final 18 permit, which as my opposing counsel has stated, 19 provide that discharges shall not cause a 20 violation of water quality standards. 21 He referenced the one provision

related to CSO discharges. However, there's

another provision that relates to all effluent discharges from the treatment facility.

And these two provisions are grounded in the Clean Water Act, mandate that water quality standards must be achieved and are well supported by EPA's record.

JUDGE AVILA: If they're in compliance with the phosphorous numeric criteria in the permit, could an enforcement action still be brought for them if the evidence showed that they weren't meeting the state water quality standard.

MS. ECKHARDT: So the way that this particular provision functions for Region 1 and implemented into this permit, the answer to that would be no.

So that leads me to talk about what is the purpose of these provisions. The purpose is two-fold.

First, these provisions serve as a reinforcement, as a legal assurance that water quality standards will be met. And they reinforce the explicit and numeric obligations

otherwise expressed in the permit, as Judge Avila has just asked about. And then the second important purpose of this provision is that it acts as a safety net.

quality standards violations cause by the

Permittee due to unanticipated circumstances. So

changes in the effluent or effluent quality or a

discharge of pollutants that weren't identified

at the time of permit issuance, and it allows the

Agency to address those violations of water

quality standards without waiting for the next

permit cycle, without waiting for a permit

modification, but to address them in a timely and

expeditious manner, and that is extremely

valuable to the Region and to the receiving

water, the Merrimack River.

JUDGE STEIN: So to go back to the question that I asked Mr. Calamita about nitrogen, is that the kind of circumstance that you're contemplate or referring to, or not necessarily?

MS. ECKHARDT: Absolutely. I think that's an excellent example where, should the conditions of the discharge include elevated levels of nitrogen during this permit cycle that cause an exceedance in the narrative water quality standard for nutrients and impact the designated uses in the Merrimack River, then that's exactly the scenario in which EPA could use this particular provision in the permit and work cooperatively with the Permittee to address that in a very timely manner.

And I think that that lends itself to the objectives of the Clean Water Act itself and the mandates under 301 again.

And those are the mandates to which these provisions are firmly grounded.

JUDGE STEIN: So how do you respond to Counsel for Lowell's argument on the issues of fair notice, the permit shield, that, you know, this is just unfair.

I mean, there is no, my understanding is there's not a -- I may be incorrect, but there

may or may not be, and I don't think there's a nitrogen limit in this permit.

MS. ECKHARDT: You're correct, there is no nitrogen limit in this permit. So I would say that the Region's position is that the City of Lowell has in fact been provided fair notice and has not been deprived of these alleged due process, the alleged due process that --

JUDGE LYNCH: Counsel, you're saying this is Region I's position. Is this also OGC's position?

MS. ECKHARDT: OGC has worked together with us in issuing this permit, and they are on the same page as us in including these permit conditions to satisfy 301 and they're -- so, yes, I think that would be the position of both OGC and Region I.

However, I would note that this is not -- again, this isn't the only manner by which a permitting authority could ensure that 301 is being satisfied.

And as the Petitioner has included in

its briefs, it referred to, for example, West
Virginia's authorized NPDES program. They take a
different tactic, a different approach, but the
endpoint is the same.

The endpoint is compliance with Section 301 and an assurance that state water quality standards will not be violated.

And while there are two alternative methods, nothing that Petitioner has put forth in its submissions or in its comments in the draft permit, demonstrates that EPA's alternative method here in Region I was inappropriate or otherwise unlawful.

And I would just go back to speak to this idea of notice a bit further, is that there is notice of what this provision means in that it states what it means.

It states, there shall be no violation of Massachusetts water quality standards. Now these standards, set forth in 314 CMR Section 4, are known. The scope of the provision is therefore known. This is not an infinite

universe.

JUDGE LYNCH: Was this in the 2005 permit?

MS. ECKHARDT: Yes, importantly so, because this Petitioner or this Permittee has been in compliance with these exact two provisions that they challenge today for 15 years.

No enforcement action has been taken against them on the basis of these two provisions. And as the Fourth Circuit stated in the Fola case, which we cited in our briefs and in Response to Comments, that experience with having a permit, the exact permit term in a permit, supports a finding that the Permittee had notice of that provision and what the provision meant.

And further, if Your Honors don't have any more questions about narrative water quality standards, I would them turn to the discussion of phosphorous.

So the limits included in this permit

for phosphorous, the numeric limits, were developed consistent with the framework established by the Clean Water Act and its regulations.

And ensure, again, that discharges will meet water quality standards. So I'm first going to discuss a bit about the methodology employed, because it seems to be the focus of Petitioner's arguments, specifically the use of the Gold Book.

And then I will, if time permits, move on to a few specific arguments that the Petitioner had related to our development of these phosphorous limits.

So first, EPA's methodology for translating the Massachusetts narrative nutrient water quality standards is this.

As Your Honors noted earlier, EPA reviewed not only the Gold Book, it reviewed the Ambient Water Quality Criteria Recommendations for Eco-Region 14, which is the geographic area that encompasses Massachusetts, and it also

looked at the Nutrient Criteria Technical Guidance Manual for Rivers and Streams.

These are all peer-reviewed materials, published under Section 304 A of the Clean Water Act. And in reviewing all these materials, EPA using its technical expertise determined there is a range of appropriate instream target limits for phosphorous.

While the Gold Book's limit is 0.1 is the upper end of that range, EPA considered the entire range and cite specific factors for the Merrimack River and the City of Lowell and determined the application of the Gold Book value was appropriate here, not has a criteria, but as a rationale supporting EPA's case by case determination of a criteria, which is then used to develop the site specific phosphorous limits in this case.

JUDGE LYNCH: Counsel, where do I find the site specific factors you used?

MS. ECKHARDT: The site specific factors we used to develop this limit include,

for example, the effluent data, the ambient data that's included in our record, the 303 D List -- which for the segment of the river that into which Lowell's facility discharges, the Merrimack River Watershed 2004 to 2009 Water Quality Assessment Report, which gives a little bit more context and information about the impairment included the 303(D) List, and that's just to name a few of the sources that are specific and were considered in developing and in translating the narrative standard into a numeric effluent limit, water quality based effluent limit here.

And furthermore, I'd say that Region

1's employment of this methodology is not new,

Your Honors. This methodology has been before

the Board and has been affirmed by the Board in

other cases.

For examples, the Attleboro appeal, the Blackstone appeal, and it has been affirmed by the First Circuit in these same cases.

So I would hope that we need not relitigate the approach and methodology employed

here today.

JUDGE LYNCH: I have a question about the use of the 7Q10. Lowell says, and Counsel can correct me if I'm misstating this, but part of what they said was 7Q10 in Massachusetts only applies to aquatic life criteria, implying that the phosphorous criteria for non-aquatic life, or -- what's your response their argument on that point?

MS. ECKHARDT: A 7Q10 value applies, as Massachusetts explains in its regulations, to the development of water quality standards, may that be related to aquatic life or otherwise.

And to the extent the Petitioner seeks to or suggests that high levels of phosphorous don't impact aquatic life, I would say that the Region disagrees with that.

But more importantly, EPA Region I's use of the 7Q10 value is in line with the Massachusetts regulation, set forth at 314 CMR 4.033, which requires compliance with water quality standards during the most severe

hydrological conditions.

And it further sets out that that means the 7Q10 value here. And this use of the 7Q10 value has, again, been affirmed by this Board in the Attleboro and PDS permit appeal.

And moving on from that, I would --

JUDGE AVILA: Can I just ask on the reg, I'm trying to tease out Judge Lynch's question, the reg says for rivers and streams, the lowest flow condition at and above which aquatic life criteria must be applied is a lowest 7Q10.

So I'm trying to tease out, did you use the 7Q10 analysis because of the impacts of aquatic life or because of nuisance, or how exactly does it fall in the Massachusetts reg?

Because your brief categorically states that

NPDES permit limit for discharges to rivers and streams must be calculated based on the 7Q10, and that's at Page 5 of the brief.

But then the cite does refer to aquatic life. So I'm still a little confused.

MS. ECKHARDT: Your Honor is right in that Subsection A of that provision does refer to aquatic life. And in referring to aquatic life, I think that is equally applicable to this particular scenario.

So I can't speak for every other permitting scenario and whether or not the 7Q10 is always the most severe, or always demonstrates the most severe hydrological condition.

But here it does, and absolutely aquatic life is impacted as is at issue in this case.

And furthermore, I'd just touch upon, because Your Honors noted the city's reactive model that it's working on, I would just emphasize the fact that EPA decided not to delay permit issuance to wait for this model, is appropriate and is consistent with the mandates of the Clean Water Act.

And further, as we heard opposing

Counsel state earlier today, he's not sure where

the city is at with developing this model. We

don't know when this model will be complete.

And nowhere in the Permittee's comments on the draft permit or in their -- pardon me, submissions to this Board, have they identified a timeframe at which this reactive model will be completed.

And so EPA was reasonable in issuing the permit without delay. And I see that I am over time.

JUDGE LYNCH: I had my pending question on the CSO water quality standard compliance language. Can you answer that?

MS. ECKHARDT: Of course. Could you repeat it for me?

JUDGE LYNCH: I'll repeat it. I was referring to the CSO policy, Page 18696, that calls for inclusion of that language in a permit, and counsel for Lowell replied, and he can correct me if I misstate this, but yes, but it says, no later than the date allowed under the state water quality standards expressed in the form of a narrative limitation.

And he's saying we don't know when that is. So what's your response to that?

MS. ECHARDT: The response is similar

to the abbreviated response that my co-counsel gave you, is that first off and most importantly, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts worked collectively with us to develop these permits in a way, and they issued the exact same language, the exact permit.

So to the extent that this quotation from the CSO policy refers to the state's development of a date of compliance, EPA would not seek to speak for the state on what date is appropriate, more importantly, these provisions for the CSO discharges and for the treatment facility in general, must comport with the mandates of the Clean Water Act itself.

So the Clean Water Act requires discharges comply with water quality standards immediately upon permit issuance.

And so to the extent that there's disagreement between these two terms, I think

that the Clean Water Act mandates govern in this case, and that's how we've written the permit terms include in the permit.

JUDGE LYNCH: I had one question about the monitoring requirements and the fact that they're more stringent that what's in 122.21(J)(4) and (5), and at least in part your response in the brief is that permitting requirements for applicants are different for renewal permits. And explain that to me, or why is that?

MS. EKCHARDT: Sure. I think that our response in the brief was identifying that the regulation that was cited by Petitioner relates to the minimum requirements that a Permittee needs in the permit renewal application process.

That in no way binds the Agency to only those monitoring and sampling requirements.

Should other information or data support or create a basis for EPA adding additional monitoring or slightly different sampling requirements, that is not inconsistent

with the regulation that Petitioner cited. 1 2 And in fact, here, we have a robust basis that's supported by the record for 3 4 including these particular specific limits. 5 And if you'd like, I can go into the basis that we've provided in the record and our 6 7 Response to Comments and Facts Sheet, or I can 8 conclude. 9 JUDGE LYNCH: We have the record. 10 Thank you. 11 JUDGE AVILA: I had one question. 12 common is it to, as I understand it, this permit 13 requires some monitoring at specific times on 14 particular days, consistently. How common is 15 It seems pretty prescriptive. 16 MS. EKCHART: It is prescriptive. 17 However, this is not new. These permit 18 provisions are included in Massachusetts 19 municipal permits across the Board. 20 It's a consistent approach that we 21 take here in Region I. And we think that it ensures representativeness and ensures that we 22

1 can use the data points to track long-term trends 2 and better monitor and understand the effluent for future permit cycles. 3 4 JUDGE AVILA: Thanks. 5 MS. ECKARD: Thank you. JUDGE STEIN: Thank you, and we will 6 7 be generous in your rebuttal time because I know 8 that the Region has gone significantly over their 9 time. MR. CALAMATI: Well, I was going to 10 11 say thank you, but you beat me up so much the 12 last time, that I should be careful what I wish 13 for. The date and time of the Massachusetts 14 water quality standards compliance deadline 15 16 matters. And they don't know. 17 They just told you, well, 18 Massachusetts put it in, and that's okay for 19 Massachusetts, but not as a federal matter. 20 If Massachusetts sticks it in, that's 21 a state permit violation. When EPA puts it in,

they're supposed to follow the law.

JUDGE LYNCH: But didn't the state certify EPA's permit under the 401 certification provisions of the Clean Water Act?

MR. CALAMATI: But the whole point, Your Honor, is today as they stand here before you, they don't know what the deadline was for compliance.

The state didn't know what it was certifying on that point. On the sampling point, which is a minor point, that goes to the professionalism of my client.

They are public servants. EPA doesn't trust them. So they have to be told a date and time to ensure that it's represented. That's not done elsewhere, and, while a minor point, Your Honors, that is offensive to the professionalism of my clients.

Fair notice. Your Honor, you asked EPA do they have fair notice of how much nitrogen they can discharge, and the happy answer was, yes. I have no clue.

I hope you do. You kind of nodded and

everybody's happy. I hope you have some idea what the nitrogen -- we have no idea and I'd love to cede time to ask them to come up and give you a number. I think we all know they can't.

By the way, you also heard that we've complied with this general water quality standards language. We have not.

In the 2010 order, on Page 4, Section 3, Paragraph 10, it recites that our CSOs have violated the impossible, thou shall not violate water quality standards. Page 4, Part 3, Paragraph 10. That's just incorrect. This is real stuff that we're violating that's impossible. It's not fair. It's not right.

On the flow, I've got a compromise for you on flow here if you're interested, but what EPA does is they take the 7Q10 flow and they figure out the max concentration and mass for things that need mass, not everything needs mass. And if it's protective at the 7Q10, it's protective, holding those concentrations as mass, is protective at every higher level.

Here's what's different about Lowell's permit. If there's more flow at any time, it means there's more treated flow and less untreated flow.

So if we go above the 32, it means that there's a net environmental benefit, that it's actually being treated as opposed to being discharged untreated.

And if you don't take this flow limit out and you tell me that I shall not intentionally violate my permit, I'm going to have to throttle my plant when I get close to the 32 mgd.

And that's never -- that argument, some treatment always beats no treatment, it's never been a winning argument. We'll take the 32 mgd limit at flows under the 7Q10.

They say they've developed a permit that's protective at the 7Q10 for 32, simply change it to say, any flow below 32, we can't exceed 32. We will accept that because it never happens.

1 JUDGE LYNCH: On the higher flow, 2 there's more flow. Isn't there more phosphorous? On a higher flow, 3 MR. CALAMITA: 4 there's more phosphorous, but there's much more 5 dilution. 6 JUDGE LYNCH: That's contrary to EPA's 7 view. 8 But, hold on. MR. CALAMATI: That 9 phosphorous leaving my CSO might be, pick a number, 20 milligrams per liter. 10 phosphorous leaving my treatment plant is going 11 12 to meet the permit limit, whatever it is. Let's say it's 1.08 milligrams per 13 14 liter. Twenty or 1.08, which one do you want? We want to work hard and give you the 1.08. 15 16 Don't give us a permit that makes me 17 deliver the 20 to you so that I'm not a criminal 18 and intentionally violating limits that have 19 unintended consequences that we don't put in here 20 in D.C. 21 On the secondary bypass provision, 22 this is a very important provision. Their answer

1 is, we never provided what we were supposed to. 2 They never told us. They met with us I don't believe they ever said, could 3 in May. 4 have an NFA from you, last May. They also met in 5 May without Counsel. JUDGE LYNCH: But isn't that the 6 City's responsibility? The CSO policy has been 7 8 in effect for decades. 9 MR. CALAMATI: Today let's say it's raining in Lowell. What are they doing today in 10 They're maximizing 11 Lowell? They're bypassing. 12 flow of the treatment, they're doing a secondary 13 bypass. 14 EPA knows that. We've been doing that In 2010, they're so conscious of 15 for 20 years. 16 this issue, they asked us for the high flow 17 management plan as part of enforcement. 18 We delivered that high flow management 19 They've done nothing but we in good faith plan. 20 have been implementing that high flow management 21 plan.

What EPA tells you is, I don't have to

1	stop oh my gosh, I don't have to stop
2	JUDGE LYNCH: You can finish.
3	MR. CALAMATI: I don't have to stop
4	bypassing. I can still maximize that flow. And
5	what I do is I give you a one timer.
6	What I do is, the day of I say, hey,
7	it's raining. We want to treat this flow. Don't
8	send it out untreated. I'll give you a bypass
9	demonstration.
10	JUDGE LYNCH: But the bottom line is
11	you have not provided the information that would
12	justify the preapproval.
13	And in your brief, you said that it's
14	form over substance. But when I look at the
15	information that's called for under the policy,
16	it seems quite substantive to me.
17	MR. CALAMATI: Your Honor, we gave
18	them exactly what they asked for in the
19	Enforcement Order. How we maximize
20	JUDGE LYNCH: I'm not talking about
21	what's in the Enforcement Order. I'm talking
22	about the alternative flexibility with respect to

bypasses.

MR. CALAMATI: Your Honor, our position is that the substance we gave them in response to the Enforcement Order absolutely satisfied the NFA requirements.

It's just two different labels, high flow management plan, no feasible alternatives.

But here's the problem I have. Their happy answer is, just send me today a bypass demonstration.

And there are two problems with that. For the last 20 years, they've never asked for it and they've never told us we're in non-compliance for not giving them that bypass notice.

JUDGE LYNCH: It's optional.

MR. CALAMATI: Or otherwise I'm in noncompliance, and they've never said over the last 20 years that I was in noncompliance for using the bypass.

In the 2010 order, they very detailed list noncompliance, and bypassing or not giving notices is not one of them. And here's the

problem I have.

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I can't honestly give it to you, because it's death, injury, or severe property damage, and I don't have any of the three.

None of our people are going to die, they're not going to be injured, and we're not going to have severe property damage because I'm just going to throttle flow at the plant.

So if you leave this provision in here, we can't bypass. And the other thing was, in the Springfield draft permit, they gave them better language -- if I may just, Your Honor --JUDGE LYNCH:

Sure.

MR. CALAMATI: They gave them different language that we would accept. wasn't perfect, but we're not looking for perfect.

And the Response to Comments says, ooh, that was just a draft. We're going to go reconsider it. Two wrongs don't make a right on bypass. I'm sorry, Your Honor.

> JUDGE LYNCH: So what are you saying

you can't provide? The cutoff point for bypasses? Cost benefit comparing bypass to abatement projects? No feasibility analysis? Those are three things that are called for.

MR. CALAMATI: Your Honor, we think, we absolutely think we can do a no feasible alternative showing, which we think the high flow management plan has done, and they've implicitly recognized that by their conduct, because they haven't said we're noncompliance, they haven't taken any enforcement, and they haven't requested these daily notices that all of a sudden now they want. We think we can make that.

We can't make the bypass showing honestly, Judge. We can wink and nod with you, if you like, but I can't tell you that there's going to be death, injury, or severe property damage.

All I'm going to do is throttle the plant, and that would be the wrong thing for the environment. The permit needs to get out of the way. D.C. gets to bypass all these other

systems.

And one other quick thing, on the long-term control plan permit requirements, EPA normally loves public notice and public participation and public transparency, and here, contrary to the policy, which says the permit should at least require nine moan controls, the narrative water quality standards, when the state says it's due, and long-term control plan development.

There's a Phase 1, Phase 2. It's Part 4(A) of the policy. There's specific permit requirements, and the public in Lowell, despite EPA normally loving the public to know what's going on, they know nothing in the permit. They didn't get to comment. They don't get to challenge it.

You rejected that for D.C. When D.C. came to you and said the schedule, the compliance schedule, should be in our permit so everybody can see it and challenge it, you agreed.

You said, no, no, EPA. You don't get

to keep it, hide it in an Enforcement Order. It needs to be in the permit.

JUDGE STEIN: My recollection is that that was otherwise required by D.C. law.

MR. CALAMATI: Yes, there may be a D.C. compliance schedule provision that says the compliance schedule shall be in the permit, but I think the concept is the same.

JUDGE AVILA: But isn't that the problem with looking at other permits, that we don't have all of the -- I mean, you can point to permits all over the place and we don't know what the underlying state water quality standards, we don't know -- I mean, so, we have to be a little careful when we start looking at other permit provisions, right?

MR. CALAMATI: Yes, Your Honor, but I will tell you something. We all know from right here in Washington, name any community in the country that discharges raw sewage, and there are plenty of them, none of those discharges meet water quality standards.

They just don't. We don't have to be there, we don't have to measure. If it's raw sewage, it doesn't meet water quality standards and the point is that Lowell is being told, you've got to meet it now.

And that's inconsistent with the law and it's inconsistent with other permits. And you should be asking those folks why. Why?

Because we're not trying to avoid necessary and appropriate requirements.

You're beating me up on a phosphorous limit. We're just about to finish voluntary phosphorous upgrading. We're trying our best, but we're just trying to make sure the permit doesn't inappropriately restrict us.

And we think it's fair to point where the wheel has been created by the EPA itself elsewhere. I see my time is up, unless there are any questions, I thank you for your time.

JUDGE LYNCH: No. Thank you.

JUDGE STEIN: Thank you. We appreciate everybody's advocacy this morning in

answering our questions, and the case is now submitted, and we will take this into account as we make our decision. Thank you very much. All rise. MS. DURR: (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 12:02 p.m.)

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<u>C E R T I F I C A T E</u>

This is to certify that the foregoing transcript

In the matter of: City of Lowell

Before: US EPA/EAB

Date: 02-20-20

Place: Washington, DC

was duly recorded and accurately transcribed under my direction; further, that said transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Court Reporter

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